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Abstract 
Understanding the motivations behind people’s voluntary contributions to public goods is 
crucial for the broader issues of economic and social development. By using the experimental 
design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), we investigate the distribution of contribution types in 
two developing countries with very high collectivism rating – Colombia and Vietnam – and 
compare our findings with those previously found in developed countries. We also investigate 
the effect of introducing disclosure of contribution on the distribution of contribution types 
and on the contribution itself. Overall, our experiments show that the distribution of 
contribution types remains unaffected by the disclosure of contributions and, on average, is 
similar both in the two countries and when compared with previous findings with the 
exception of proportion of free-riders.  
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1. Introduction  
Research on public goods has for a long time focused on the conditions under which 
individuals cooperate, and in recent decades public goods experiments have been used as the 
workhorse to better understand contributions to public goods (see overviews in e.g., 
Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003). One early insight from these experiments 
was that behind the veil of an average positive amount being contributed to a public good, 
individual contributions varied widely and included a large fraction of free-riders. To gain 
better insight into people’s contribution behavior to public goods, but also to better 
understand the dynamics of contributions, it is important to investigate the distribution of 
different types of contributor in a population. One important contributor type that has been 
identified is the conditional cooperator, i.e., a subject who will contribute an amount that he or 
she thinks will be similar to the contributions of others.1
One approach to investigate conditional cooperation empirically is to explain 
contribution in the current period by comparing it with those from the previous period; for 
example Keser and Van Winden (2000) found a significant and positive relationship between 
these two components. Fischbacher et al. (2001) developed an alternative examination of 
types of contributor by using a public goods experiment based on the strategy method. In their 
experimental design, subjects are asked in an incentive-compatible way not only how much 
they would contribute to the public good as in a standard public goods experiment (i.e., 
unconditional contribution) but also how much they would contribute conditional on the 
average amount contributed by the other group members ranging from a zero contribution to 
the maximum amount (i.e., conditional contributions). Based on people’s conditional 
contributions, free-riders are identified as subjects who contribute zero regardless of the 
contributions made by others, while conditional cooperators are those who increase their 
contributions as the average contributions made by others increases. In Fischbacher et al. 
(2001), free-riders and conditional cooperators are the two dominating types; on average 
conditional cooperators make up a larger proportion of the population than free-riders, but 
there are variations between locations (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Herrmann and 
Thöni, 2009; Kocher et al., 2008; Thöni et al., 2009). In a follow-up paper, Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2010) show in a within-subject design that the types identified using the strategy 
method correspond to behavior in a standard multi-period public goods experiment where 
  
                                                 
1 For an early discussion on this topic in psychological literature, see, e.g., Kelley and Stahelski (1970).  
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only unconditional contributions are elicited, supporting the behavioral validity of the strategy 
method in this context.  
The behavioral pattern of conditional cooperation can be explained by various kinds of 
motivations. Benabou and Tirole (2006) have categorized motivations into three main 
categories: intrinsic, extrinsic, and image. While intrinsic and extrinsic motivations focus on 
factors such as altruism and monetary rewards respectively, image motivation focuses on the 
fact that individuals derive utility from how other people perceive them (i.e., social approval), 
and from the way they perceive themselves (e.g. self-image). Thus, the model by Benabou 
and Tirole (2006) offers two explanations for conditional co-operations namely intrinsic (e.g., 
greed and prosociality) and image motivations. Conditional cooperation in a standard 
anonymous public goods experiment setting can be explained by intrinsic motivations and 
self-image from the model by Benabou and Tirole (2006). Previous empirical evidence 
suggests that introducing disclosure can enhance contribution to the provision of public goods 
(e.g., Ariely et al. 2009; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent 2005). In a laboratory setting, Rege 
and Telle (2004) investigate the effect of disclosure in a one-shot public goods experiment 
where the subjects reveal their own contributions to the other group members. They find 
significantly higher contributions when contributions are disclosed. Thus, this indicates that 
the overall effect of the introduction of disclosure on changes in intrinsic (for example a 
negative effect through greed) and image (for example a positive effect through social 
approval) motivations resulted in a positive net effect on cooperative behavior. Noussair and 
Tucker (2007), however, find an insignificant effect of disclosure when using a design similar 
to Rege and Telle (2004), and in a multi-period public goods experiment with disclosure they 
find significantly lower contributions. It should be noted that the experiment by Noussair and 
Tucker (2007) used a multi-period setting, and thus there is a strategic motivation for 
cooperation in their case, which might affect behavior negatively through intrinsic and image 
motivations. The first objective of the present paper is to study the effect of disclosure of the 
contribution to the public good on contribution behavior and contribution type by using the 
innovative between-subject design by Fischbacher et al. (2001) combined with disclosure of 
contributions.   
A recent development in public goods experiments is the investigation of behavioral 
differences and similarities across societies. Most of the knowledge from public goods 
experiments is based on multi-period experiments in Western Europe and the U.S. Herrmann 
et al. (2008) conduct a standard 10-period public goods experiment in 16 different locations 
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worldwide including Western European countries, China, South Korea, Turkey, Australia, 
Saudi-Arabia, and the Yemen, and find differences in initial contribution between locations 
but a similar rate of decay in contributions over time. Gächter et al. (2010) present a more 
detailed analysis of the data in Herrmann et al. (2008) focusing on cooperation and culture. 
By using the definition of culture by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Hofstede (2001), 
countries can be classified into different cultures. The largest cultures missing from the 
studies by Herrmann et al. (2008) are South East Asia, Africa and Latin America. In a 
decomposition analysis, Gächter et al. (2010) show that by and large, contributions in the 
standard public goods experiment are only determined by culture to a very small extent, but 
that group and individual behaviour have a much greater effect. However, the application of 
an experimental design, as suggested by Fischbacher et al. (2001), which allows for detailed 
classification of types of contributor, has to a much lesser extent been applied both generally 
and to different cultures worldwide (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001 in Switzerland; Fischbacher 
and Gächter, 2010 in Swizterland; Herrmann and Thöni, 2009 in Russia; Kocher et al., 2008 
in Austria, the USA and Japan; Thöni et al., 2009 in Denmark). We conducted our public 
goods experiment in two locations where very few published public goods experiments have 
been conducted, i.e., in Vietnam in South Asia and in Colombia in Latin America, using the 
design by Fischbacher et al. (2001).2
Understanding about how disclosing contributions affects contribution patterns within 
and across cultures is limited in previous literature. Thus, by conducting the same public 
goods experiment both in Vietnam and in Colombia, we can not only compare the distribution 
of contributor types between these two countries but also compare the effects of disclosure on 
both contributions and contributor types across culture. Research evidence in cross-cultural 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology suggest that people in different cultures have 
 On the dimension of collectivism versus individualism 
in the context of people’s integration in groups, both Colombia and Vietnam have a very high 
collectivism rating (Hofstede, 2001). This is in contrast to, for example, the USA, which has 
one of the highest rating for individualism, and Switzerland (where several of the experiment 
by Fischbacher and colleagues were conducted), which also scores high for individualism. 
Our second objective in this paper is to investigate the distribution of contributor types in 
Vietnam in South East Asia and in Colombia in Latin America, using the design by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001).  
                                                 
3 At the time of the experiment, 1 USD=2,000 COP and 1 USD=17,500 VND. Two of this paper’s authors are 
native speakers of Spanish and Vietnamese, respectively. The English instructions were translated into Spanish 
and Vietnamese and then back into English to check for translation accuracy.  
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different perceptions and interpretations of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of 
the two (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Many Asian cultures, like the Vietnamese, insist on 
the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other and are characterized by an 
interdependent view of the self (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Previous experimental research 
has documented very high, by western standards, levels of trust and cooperation amongst 
strangers in Vietnam (Carpenter et al., 2004) denoting the existence of social capital bridging.  
In Colombia, however, social capital is of the bonding type centering around family and small 
groups of friends and social capital bridging tends to be very scarce (Thoumi, 2009). It could 
be said that in Colombia there is an interdependent view of the self that is moderated by a 
highly selective attention to others, most characteristically family and friends, while in 
Vietnam there is an interdependent view of the self with a lower degree of selection.  Subjects 
with an independent view of self should be motivated by those actions that allow expression 
of their inner attributes whereas people with an interdependent view of self should be 
motivated by actions that enhance their sense of connection to others (Markus and Kitayama, 
1991). Since disclosure is in front of strangers, we would expect if anything Vietnamese to be 
more sensitive to strangers than Colombians explained by image motivation. However, since 
the degree of collectivism is already high in Vietnam and Colombia (Hofstede, 2001), there 
might be less effect of disclosure compared with other countries where disclosure has been 
tested. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental 
design and procedures, Section 3 contains the results, and finally, Section 4 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Experimental design 
We used a linear public goods experiment based on the strategy method as developed by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subject i’s payoff in tokens from the public goods experiment is 
given by 
                                                                             (1) 
where  is the amount allocated to the public good by subject i. Each group consisted of four 
randomly matched subjects, where each subject was endowed with 20 tokens. Each token 
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earned in the experiment corresponded to 750 COP (Colombian Pesos) in Colombia and 6000 
VND (Vietnamese Dong) in Vietnam. We determined the exchange rate for the tokens in each 
country such that the average payoff of a subject would slightly exceed the average earning 
from a student’s part-time job.3
Since our experiment was based on the experimental design by Fischbacher et al. 
(2001), we elicited both conditional and unconditional contributions to the public good. In the 
conditional contribution part, the strategy method was used, i.e., subjects were asked, in what 
is called the conditional contribution table, how much they would like to contribute to a 
public good conditional on all possible combinations of the average contribution levels 
(rounded to the nearest integer) of the other group members. In the unconditional part, 
subjects were asked how much they would like to contribute to a public good, replicating a 
standard one-shot public good experiment. In order to make each of the choices incentive-
compatible, we randomly chose three subjects in each group and let their unconditional 
contributions count as their contributions to the public good. The payoff-relevant contribution 
for the fourth subject was based on his or her conditional contribution table, where the 
contributed amount corresponds to the amount stated conditional on the average unconditional 
contributions of the other three members. Finally, by adding the three unconditional 
contributions and the conditional contribution by the fourth member, the total contribution by 
the group to the public good could be calculated using equation (1). Afterwards, we also 
asked subjects about their beliefs regarding what others had contributed unconditionally. As 
in Gächter and Renner (2010), subjects were rewarded in tokens for accurate guesses.  
 The marginal per-capita return (MPCR) from the public good 
was set at 0.4. For a rational and selfish subject, it is obvious that any MPCR below one 
results in a dominant strategy to free-ride, i.e., to contribute zero to the public good. However, 
from a social perspective, it is optimal to contribute the whole endowment because MPCR*n 
> 1, where n is number of group members. Thus, an MPCR of 0.4 fulfills the requirement for 
a public good by creating a conflict between private and social optima. 
The subjects were recruited from undergraduate students at Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia-Sede Medellín in Medellin, Colombia and at Nha Trang University in Nha Trang, 
Vietnam. Subjects were randomly selected from a list of people who registered in response to 
an e-mail invitation to participate in the experiment. Using the chi-square test, we cannot 
                                                 
3 At the time of the experiment, 1 USD=2,000 COP and 1 USD=17,500 VND. Two of this paper’s authors are 
native speakers of Spanish and Vietnamese, respectively. The English instructions were translated into Spanish 
and Vietnamese and then back into English to check for translation accuracy.  
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reject the hypothesis of equal distribution of gender and degree of selfishness at the 5% 
significance level between the two treatments in each country.  
 We ran two treatments (with two sessions per treatment) in each country. In the no-
disclosure treatment, neither the identity of subjects nor the contributions made by the 
subjects were revealed during or after the experiment. In the disclosure treatment, each 
subject’s contribution and group membership were disclosed to everyone in the session once 
all contributions had been submitted. Up to the point of disclosure, there were no differences 
between the treatments except that the subjects in the disclosure treatment received 
information about the disclosure procedure in their instructions. At the time of disclosure, the 
four group members were asked to come together, one group at a time, and sit down on four 
chairs in front of the remaining twenty participants in the session. Once the four group 
members were seated, each subject was asked one at a time by using experimental 
identification numbers to stand up, whereby his or her payoff-relevant contribution to the 
public good was publicly announced by the experimenter. All subjects in the disclosure 
treatments knew about the disclosure procedures in advance since they were clearly described 
in the instructions for the experiment.  
We disclose the income-relevant contribution instead of the individual’s strategy in the 
contribution table mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, disclosing the income-relevant 
contribution of each participant means that our paper is in line with previous literature that has 
studied the effect of disclosure on contributions to a public good which ex-ante facilitates 
comparison with other papers that have studied the issue like Rege and Telle (2004) and 
Noussair and Tucker (2007). On the other hand, it is difficult to know if, and if so, how, 
disclosing their income-relevant contribution rather than their strategy affects subjects’ 
behavior. In an interesting paper, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) compare the strategy and 
the contribution methods in a standard multi-period public goods experiment. They find that 
people classified as conditional cooperators by the strategy method behave accordingly in the 
standard public goods experiment. In addition, similar findings were made for free-riders 
indicating the behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments. To our 
knowledge, these are the only direct results on this topic. In a survey paper by Brandts and 
Charness (2011), they conclude that on average the strategy method and the direct response 
method result in consistent results. By and large, we do not a priori have any expectations 
that the effect will be in one direction or the other, rather we expect this choice not to have an 
effect based on above, but this will be a research question for the future. 
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At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were handed out and read aloud to the 
subjects. The instructions included several examples and exercises and the subjects were 
allowed enough time to solve the exercises on their own. Once all participants had completed 
the exercises, the experimenter solved them in public. Any remaining questions that the 
subjects had were then answered in private. The subjects decided how much to contribute 
unconditionally to the public good, and filled in the contribution table where they indicated 
their contribution to the group account given the possible average contributions (rounded to 
the nearest integer) of the other three members of the group. After collecting the decision 
sheets, the participants were asked to state their beliefs regarding the total unconditional 
contribution levels of the other three participants to the public good account. Finally, the 
subjects completed a socio-economic questionnaire. The experimenter randomly selected, by 
using the identification numbers, one member in each group for whom the conditional 
contribution was the income-relevant decision and then calculated the amount to be paid to 
each subject. For the disclosure treatment, the contribution-revealing stage was conducted 
after the collection of the questionnaires. At the end of the experiment, all subjects were paid 
privately in cash (on average approximately 23,000 COP and 181,000 VND).  
 
3. Experimental results 
We use the conditional contribution tables to analyze the relationship between a subject’s own 
conditional contribution and the average contribution of the other members in his or her 
group. In Figure 1, following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we plot the relationship between the 
average own conditional contribution (on the vertical axis) and the average contribution of the 
other members (on the horizontal axis). The overall picture is the same across locations and 
treatments, and shows that people contribute more when the average of others’ contributions 
increases. The slope is less than one, which indicates imperfect conditional cooperation. 
Moreover, there is a positive average contribution to the public good when others give zero. 
This can be interpreted as altruism, and exists in both treatments for both countries. These 
patterns are all consistent with previous studies. 
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Figure 1. Average own contribution level for each average contribution level of other group 
members. 
 
 
Based on the conditional contributions, we categorize subjects into different types of 
contributors, using the same classifications as in, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001) and 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). We classify a subject as a free-rider if his or her own 
contribution is zero for all possible average contributions of the other members, while a  
conditional cooperator is someone whose own conditional contribution increases weakly and 
monotonically with the average contribution of the other members. In addition, subjects are 
also classified as conditional cooperators if the relationship between their own average 
contributions and those of others is positive and significant at the 1% significance level based 
on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Hump-shaped contributors (triangle 
contributors) show weakly and monotonically increasing contributions (or increasing with a 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient at the 1% significance level) up to a certain level of  the 
contributions of others, but beyond this level their conditional contributions decrease based on 
a reversed classification. The remaining subjects are categorized as others.  
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 Table 1 summarizes the distribution of contributors – free-riders, conditional 
cooperators, hump-shaped, and others – in our treatments and in previous studies. One focus 
of the paper is to investigate the effects of disclosure and compare them across countries. We 
begin by testing the null hypothesis of equal distribution of contribution types in the no-
disclosure and disclosure treatments using a Fisher’s exact test in each country. We can reject 
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level in the Colombian experiment (p-value=0.04), 
but not in the Vietnamese experiment (p-value=0.42). Then we perform the pair-wise tests of 
equal proportion of types between treatments in each country. The result of the Fisher’s exact 
test only shows that the proportion of the “other” type is significantly different at the 5% level 
in Colombia. The main effect of the disclosure seems to be that the proportion of the “other” 
type decreases, which might be explained by the idea that subjects consider their contributions 
more carefully when they are to be revealed in public.  
In Table 1, we also present the proportion of subjects classified into the four categories 
used in Fischbacher et al. (2001) (conducted in Switzerland), Thöni et al. (2009) (in 
Denmark), Herrmann and Thöni (2009) (in Russia), and Kocher et al. (2008) (in the U.S., 
Austria, and Japan). When we compare the no-disclosure treatments, we notice similar 
distributions between Colombia and Vietnam. However, when compared with previously 
conducted experiments, there are fewer free-riders in Vietnam and Colombia than in 
Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Japan. Moreover, we note that the proportion of 
conditional cooperators varies across locations.  
Table 2 shows p-values of pair-wise tests of the null hypothesis of equal distribution of 
contributor types across locations using Fisher’s exact tests. For these comparisons we use our 
results from the no disclosure treatment in both countries. We first test whether the 
distribution of contributors is the same in Colombia and Vietnam, and find that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis. We then conduct tests to compare Colombia and Vietnam with the 
previous studies reported above. We find significant differences at the 5% level when we 
compare with the experiments in Switzerland and Japan, and in the case of Vietnam when 
compared with the U.S. When testing the null hypothesis of equal proportion of each 
contributor type across countries we cannot reject the null hypothesis for conditional 
cooperators and hump-shape contributors in any of the pair-wise comparisons between the 
findings from Colombia and Vietnam as well as between the two countries and the results 
reported in the other reported studies at the 5% significance level, except when compare 
hump-shape contributors of Vietnam with Danes in Thöni et al. (2009) and Americans in 
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Kocher et al. (2008). The proportions of free-riders in Colombia and Vietnam are similar in 
proportion to those found in Russia and the U.S., yet significantly different from the 
proportions found in Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, and Japan. Thus, overall the differences 
in the distribution of types can be explained by the differences in the proportion of free-riders.  
Table 1. Distribution of contributor types.  
 Colombia Vietnam Switzerland  
Denmark Russia 
 U.S. Austria Japan 
The present study The present study Fischbacher et al. (2001) 
Thöni et 
al. (2009) 
Herrmann 
and Thöni 
(2009) 
Kocher et al. (2008) 
No 
Disclosure Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
No 
Disclosure 
Free-rider 4.2% 12.5% 4.2% 4.2% 29.6% 13,9% 6.3% 8.3% 22.2% 36.1% 
Conditional 
cooperator 62.5% 75.0% 50.0% 58.3% 50.0% 
70,2% 55.6% 80.6% 44.4% 41.7% 
Hump- 
shape 8.3% 6.3% 8.3% 14.6% 13.6% 
- 7.5% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 
Others 25.0% 6.3% 37.5% 22.9% 6.8% 15,9% 30.6% 11.1% 22.2% 11.1% 
Number of 
observations 
48 48 48 48 44 1070 160 36 36 36 
Note. In Thöni et al. (2009) hump-shaped type is classified as others (about one third of the subjects classified as 
others). 
 
Table 2. Fisher’s exact test of equal proportion of types in pair-wise comparisons (p-values). 
 Colombia-Vietnam 
Colombia-
Switzerland 
Colombia
-Russia 
Colombia – 
Denmark  
Colombia
-U.S. 
Colombia
-Austria 
Colomb
ia-Japan 
Free-rider >0.99 <0.01 0.74 0.05 0.65 0.02 <0.01 
Conditional 
cooperator 
0.30 0.29 0.41 0.26 0.09 0.12 0.08 
Hump-shape >0.99 0.51 0.77 <0.01 0.13 0.72 0.72 
Others 0.27 0.02 0.59 - 0.16 0.80 0.16 
Overall 0.59 <0.01 0.85 - 0.08 0.07 <0.01 
  Vietnam-
Switzerland 
Vietnam- 
Russia 
Vietnam - 
Denmark 
Vietnam-
U.S. 
Vietnam-
Austria 
Vietna
m-
Japan 
Free-rider  <0.01 0.74 0.05 0.65 0.02 <0.01 
Conditional 
cooperator 
 >0.99 0.51 <0.01 0.01 0.66 0.51 
Hump-shape  0.51 0.77 <0.01 0.13 0.72 0.72 
Others  <0.01 0.38 - 0.01 0.16 0.01 
Overall  <0.01 0.82 - <0.01 0.06 <0.01 
Note. In Thöni et al. (2009) hump-shaped type is classified as others. 
 
The average unconditional contribution in the no-disclosure treatment is around 39.9% of the 
endowment in Colombia (7.98 tokens) and 25.8% of the endowment in Vietnam (5.17 
tokens).4
                                                 
4 We present more detailed descriptive statistics for each treatment and each type of contributor in Appendix. 
 In the disclosure treatment, the average unconditional contribution is 48.1% of the 
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endowment in Colombia and 31.9% in Vietnam.5
 
 We observe a similar absolute increase in 
unconditional contributions in percentage points in both countries: around 8.2 percentage 
points in Colombia and 6.1 percentage points in Vietnam. As shown in Figure 2, introducing 
disclosure in the Colombian case results in an increase in the proportion of subjects 
contributing the whole endowment, while in Vietnam there is a shift from a large fraction of 
contributions below 50% of the endowment to a spike at an unconditional contribution of 
50% of the endowment. In an overall test for the null hypothesis of equal distributions of 
unconditional contributions in the no-disclosure and disclosure treatments, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis for either country (p-value=0.24 for Columbia and p-value=0.08 for Vietnam) 
based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Using this test for the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions of guessed average unconditional contribution by others, we also cannot reject 
the hypothesis of equal distributions for both Colombia and Vietnam (p-value is equal to 0.73 
and 0.67, respectively). 
Figure 2.  Histograms of unconditional contributions per treatment 
 
                                                 
5 A related issue is whether the unconditional contributions of subjects of a specific contribution type have been 
affected by the disclosure treatment. To test the null hypothesis of no effect on unconditional contribution 
between treatments among subjects classified as one specific type of contributor, we conducted a Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test. Since we classified subjects into four types in two countries, we conducted eight tests. We 
could not reject the hypothesis of no difference in unconditional contribution between the treatments in any of 
the eight tests. 
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4. Discussion 
This paper has investigated whether the distribution of contribution types in public goods 
experiments is robust across locations and when behavior is disclosed based on the 
experimental design developed by Fischbacher et al. (2001). The two countries included in 
our study – Colombia and Vietnam – have a very low degree of individualism when using the 
Hofstede scale compared with other countries where the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design has 
been applied. The results show conditional cooperator is the dominating type across locations 
similar to the results in other studies, but the proportion of them varies. Contrary, the 
proportion of free-riders differs significantly ly when compared with other studies. This paper 
also compares the effect of disclosure and the overall results suggest that disclosure has a 
small impact on contributions to public goods.  
The small increase in contributions when disclosure is introduced is different from the 
stronger influences of other institutions such as monetary punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Herrmann et al., 2008). 6
                                                 
6 Although monetary punishment has been shown to increase contributions, the overall effect on welfare tends to 
be negative in earlier periods. However, in a 50 period public goods experiment with monetary punishment, 
Gächter et al. (2008) find positive and significant welfare effects. In contrast, disclosure does not incur any 
monetary costs. 
 It should however be noted that previous findings on the 
effect of introducing disclosure on contributions are mixed (e.g., Rege and Telle, 2004; 
Noussair and Tucker, 2007). The small positive effect from disclosure may indicate either that 
the image motivation to increase contribution level when subject to disclosure is small or the 
net effect of image and intrinsic motivations is small. A detailed analyses show that 
distribution of types is stable across our treatments. Thus, given that different institutions such 
as monetary punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000), social disapproval (e.g., Masclet et 
al., 2003), exclusion (e.g., Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010) and 
disclosure have different impact on individuals’ behaviour, it seems important to better 
understand the impact on the distribution of contribution types. Thus, we need to better 
understand why some individuals who are classified as one specific contribution type in a 
standard public goods experiment behave differently when certain institutions are introduced, 
or, in other words, what makes it worthwhile for them to change, and to be able to explain 
these changes by motivations. A related issue, Gächter et al. (2010) show in the monetary 
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punishment case that differences in contributions are, to an important degree, determined by 
cultural differences, and thus culture should also be one of the focuses in this field of 
research. In our case, intrinsic motivation and image motivations in Vietman and Colombia 
can be represented by the degree of individualism according to the Hofstede scale. Colombia 
and Vietnam have a very low degree of individualism when using the Hofstede scale, and thus 
the small effect of disclosure might then be explained by the degree of collectivism in both 
countries. Needless to say, future research is needed to investigate the roots of cooperation, 
where understanding of the role of different types of motivations is needed, to be able to 
better understand observed differences in contributions to public goods in various 
circumstances.      
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Appendix. Distribution of contributor types – detailed descriptive statistics.  
 Colombia Vietnam 
The present study The present study 
No Disclosure Disclosure No Disclosure Disclosure 
Dist. Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Guess Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Dist. 
Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Guess Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Dist. 
Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Guess Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont 
Dist. 
Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont. 
Guess Avg. 
Uncond. 
Cont 
Free-rider 4.2% 0.5 2.00 12.5% 0.7 3.5 4.2% 10.0 10.0 4.2% 0.5 0.7 
Conditional cooperator 62.5% 9.3 9.5 75.0% 11.6 10.2 50.0% 5.5 6.4 58.3% 7.4 7.0 
Hump- shape 8.3% 8.8 8.3 6.3% 6.7 8.2 8.3% 1.5 5.9 14.6% 5.1 5.2 
Others 25.0% 5.6 6.2 6.3% 7.0 3.4 37.5% 5.1 5.8 22.9% 5.6 6.3 
Number of observations 48 48 48 48 
Note. Dist.: Distribution. Avg. uncond. cont.: average unconditional contribution. Guess avg. uncond. cont.:  guessed average unconditional contribution. 
